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Abstract—This paper considers the noise-enhanced distributed
detection problem in the presence of Byzantine (malicious) nodes
by suitably adding stochastic resonance (SR) noise. We consider
two metrics - the minimum number of Byzantines (αblind ) needed
to blind the fusion center as a security metric and the KullbackLeibler divergence (DKL ) as a detection performance metric. We
show that αblind increases when SR noise is added at the honest
nodes. When Byzantines also start adding SR noise to their
observations, we see no gain in terms of αblind . However, the
detection performance of the network does improve with SR.
We also consider a game theoretic formulation where this
problem of distributed detection in the presence of Byzantines
is modeled as a minimax game between the Byzantines and the
inference network, and numerically find Nash equilibria.
The case when SR noise is added to the signals received at
the fusion center (FC) from the sensors is also considered. Our
numerical results indicate that while there is no gain in terms of
αblind , the network-wide performance measured in terms of the
deflection coefficient does improve in this case.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Inference networks have been widely investigated for the
past three decades in order to detect or estimate a phenomenon
of interest. Specifically, the distributed detection framework
has been considered extensively, wherein several nodes sense
the surrounding environment and collaboratively make a global
inference at the fusion center (FC). It is only in the recent
past that the researchers have investigated the problem of
security threats in these networks. In this paper, we consider
the problem of Data Falsification attacks (in other words,
Byzantine attacks) in the context of distributed inference
networks. Our primary focus is on designing a technique based
on the stochastic resonance (SR) phenomenon to safeguard the
network from Byzantine attacks.
SR is a physical phenomenon where the output signals of
some nonlinear systems can be amplified by adding noise
to the input. This counter-intuitive phenomenon was first
observed by Benzi et al., in [1], and, we have, in the past
[2], explored and developed the theory of SR for statistical
inference problems. For a single sensor detection problem
formulated under the Neyman-Pearson (NP) framework, the
This work was supported in part by AFOSR Grants FA-9550-09-1-0064
and FA-9550-09-C-0146.

optimal SR noise to be added to the observations at the
input of the detector has a probability density function (pdf)
consisting of two Kronecker delta functions each occurring
with probability β and (1 − β). For the Bayesian case, a single
delta function with unit probability (i.e., a constant) is the
optimal SR noise pdf. The formulation was also extended to a
distributed detection framework in [3]. Here, we consider the
case when some of the sensors deployed in a region of interest
(ROI) deliberately report incorrect decisions to a remotely
located fusion center, thus causing a reduction in the overall
detection performance. Here, we show how one could use SR
to counter such Byzantine attacks.
Byzantine attacks (Figure 1) are those attacks in which
some of the sensors within the network send false information to the fusion center in order to disrupt the inference
process. The Byzantines intend to deteriorate the detection
performance of the network and therefore, modify their local
decisions before transmitting to the fusion center. Marano et
al. considered a distributed detection problem for an inference
network in the presence of Byzantines in [4] and presented
the optimal attacking distribution for the Byzantines under the
error exponent framework. In finding the minimum fraction
of Byzantines (αblind ) needed to make the two hypotheses
indistinguishable to the FC, they assumed that the Byzantines
have perfect knowledge about the true hypothesis. Rawat
et al. in [5] considered the case when Byzantines did not
have the knowledge regarding hypothesis present, and gave
a closed-form expression for αblind under both independent
and collaborative Byzantine attacks.
In the past, reputation-based schemes at the fusion center
have been suggested to counter these attacks. Rawat et al.
analysed a similar problem in [5], for the cases of independent
attack by individual Byzantines as well as the collaborative
attack case. They developed optimal attacking strategies, analyzed limits on the network performance under these attacks
and proposed identify-and-eliminate strategies for the fusion
center to counter these attacks. Note that this scheme works
only when the percentage of Byzantines in the network is less
than 50%. On the other hand, the adaptive learning scheme
proposed by Vempaty et al. in [6] works for any fraction of
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Fig. 1: Byzantine Threat on a Distributed Inference Network

Byzantines in the network. They learnt the operating points
of each and every node in the inference network not only to
identify the Byzantines, but also to use the learnt Byzantine
parameters in an adaptive fusion rule in order to improve the
detection performance over Rawat et al.’s scheme [5].
We suggest the use of SR phenomenon to counter these
attacks under more severe cases. We explore the optimal
SR to be added, where it should be added and under what
conditions, it provides improvement in security along with
the performance gain, i.e., an increase in αblind along with
an improvement in a detection performance metric. We have
also considered the attacks in the presence of different types
of channels between the phenomenon of interest and the
local sensors. We found analytical expressions to quantify the
improvement in performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents a general system model and performance metrics that are applicable to the different formulations of the
noise-enhanced distributed inference problem, which are later
presented in III. We present the two scenarios of SR being
employed locally at the sensors and SR being applied at the
FC. In Section IV, we present a game-theoretic formulation of
the noise-enhanced distributed inference problem in the presence of Byzantines. Next, in Section V, we present numerical
results for the different scenarios and formulations presented
earlier. Finally, we conclude the work in Section VI with a
few comments on our future work.
II. G ENERALIZED S YSTEM M ODEL
We consider a binary hypotheses testing problem involving
hypotheses H0 and H1 , with prior probabilities π0 and π1
respectively. Let the collaborative inference network comprise
of N nodes, M of which are Byzantine (malicious) in nature,
and a fusion center which makes a global decision based on
the observations collected locally at the sensor nodes. The
Byzantine nodes send false information to the fusion center in
order to deteriorate the performance of the inference network.
The inference network tries to employ SR noise as well as
counterattack the Byzantines by changing its strategy of decision making in order to reduce the performance deterioration
caused by Byzantines.
We denote the i.i.d. observations made at the ith sensor as
Xi , and the distribution of Xi conditioned on the hypothesis

Hk as p(Xi |Hk ), k = 0, 1. In particular, we consider the signal
model Xi = θ + ni , where θ = 0 under H0 , θ = A under H1
and ni ∼ pn (·) for simplicity.
Due to the presence of a suboptimal quantizer at the local
sensors, under Scenario-1 (In Scenario-2, SR noise will be
added at the FC), SR noise wi is added to the observations
in order to improve the detection performance. Hence, the
updated observation at the ith sensor is given by
Yi = Xi + wi

∀i = 1, · · · , N.

(1)

Here, we denote the pdf of the SR noise wi added at the
honest node as pH
w (w) and that of the Byzantine node as
pB
(w).
Let
z
,
∀i
= 1, · · · , N be defined as
i
w
zi = ni + wi

(2)

Then pdf of zi can be written as
>
>
p<T
(t) = pn (t) ∗ p<T
(t);
z
w

(3)

where pn (t) is the noise pdf in the channel between the
>
phenomenon and the sensor and p<T
(t) is the pdf of SR
w
at the sensor of type T (Honest/Byzantine).
We restrict our discussion to a hard quantizer at the local
sensors and therefore, if the suboptimal quantization function
is given by γ<T > (.) for a node of type T (T = H/B), the
operating point of the honest and the Byzantine nodes in the
ROC is given by (PfHa , PdH ) and (PfBa , PdB ) respectively. Note
that, in this paper, we focus our discussion on the use of sign
detector as the suboptimal quantizer at the local decisionmaking stage. These operating points can be expressed as
follows, for a sign detector employed in the sensor of type
T.
Pd<T >

= P (Yi ≥ 0|H1 ) = P (zi<T > ≥ −A)
=

>
Pf<T
a

Z

(4a)

∞
−A

>
pn (t) ∗ p<T
(t) dt
w

=

P (Yi ≥ 0|H0 ) = P (zi<T > ≥ 0)

=

Z

0

(4b)

∞
>
pn (t) ∗ p<T
(t) dt
w

If α is the probability with which a node is Byzantine, then
the effective operating point of any given node, as observed
by the FC, is given by
Pf a = α(1 − PfBa ) + (1 − α)PfHa

(5)

Pd = α(1 − PdB ) + (1 − α)PdH

Note
 that, empirically, α can be expressed as the fraction
of Byzantine nodes in the inference network. We assume
that the fusion center has knowledge about the fraction of
Byzantines, α = M
N in the network, but cannot differentiate
between the honest and Byzantine sensors (same as Rawat et
al. in [5]).
Assuming that the channels between the sensors and the
FC are ideal, if {u1 , · · · , uN } denote the set of transmitted
messages by the sensors to the FC, then a global decision u0 ∈
{H0 , H1 } is made by fusing these individual local decisions
as follows.
u0 = γ0 (u1 , · · · , uN )
(6)
M
N

A. Performance metrics
In this paper, we consider Kullback Leibler Divergence as
the detection performance metric and αblind as the security
performance metric, which are described as follows.
Kullback-Leibler Divergence: DKL has been used as a
performance metric for distributed detection systems. It is a
measure of the distance between two probability distributions.
Here, the two distributions are in the presence of the two
hypotheses H0 and H1 , i.e., P (ui |H0 ) and P (ui |H1 ) respectively. As pointed out by Rawat et al. in [5], the Byzantines
would try to maximize the damage they can cause to the
sensing process. This can be done by reducing DKL which
results in more decision errors.


p(u|H1 )
1
· E log
DKL =
N
p(u|H0 )
= D(P (ui |H1 )||P (ui |H0 ))
=

X

j∈{0,1}

P (ui |H1 ) log



P (ui |H1 )
P (ui |H0 )

(7)


=

=

[Pd

H

Pd H − Pf a H
− Pf a H ] + [Pd B − Pf a B ]
Z

0

−A

Z

pn (t) ∗ pH
w (t) dt

0
−A



B
pn (t) ∗ pH
w (t) + pw (t) dt

THE

In this section, we analyze the effect of stochastic resonance
on the network performance in the presence of Byzantine
attack. Chen et al., in [7], have shown that, for sub-optimal and
non-linear systems, SR can be used to improve the detection
performance under a constraint on the false alarm rate. Hence,
in this paper, we employ SR locally at the sensors in Section
III-A and do the same at the FC in Section III-B and analyze
the gain in the detection performance.
A. SR employed at the local sensors
We present our results in two different cases. First, we
present an ideal case where SR is employed only at the honest
nodes, demonstrating the potential of SR effect in terms of the
gain in security. Next, we show the most general case when
SR is applied at both honest and Byzantine nodes.
1) CASE-1 (SR employed only at the Honest Nodes): Here,
we investigate the most favorable case to the network, wherein
SR is added only at the honest local sensors and the Byzantines
flip their decisions deterministically. One can achieve this
system in practice if there is an underlying scheme as proposed
by [5] or [6] in the network, which lets the FC identify the
Byzantine nodes. The nodes which are tagged honest, are later
informed to employ SR through some feedback mechanism,
while the nodes that are tagged Byzantine are left ignorant.
Presently, we do not consider the uncertainty involved in the
tagging process. This is an important problem which will be
addressed in our future work.
We start off with the following lemma where we analyze the
behavior of αblind and find the optimal SR pdf that maximizes
αblind from honest sensors’ perspective.
Lemma 1. To maximize αblind ,the optimum SR noise at the
honest nodes can be expressed as
pH
w,opt (t) = δ(t − t0 )
i.e. 1-peak SR is optimum for obtaining the maximum αblind

Blinding fraction of Byzantines: αblind is the minimum
fraction of Byzantines needed to degrade the performance of
the network (DKL = 0) to the maximum possible extent so
that the network is totally blind of the phenomenon of interest.
Similar to Rawat et al., in [5], this serves as a security metric
that defines the level of security, a given system is offering.
This can be expressed as follows.
αblind

III. N OISE -E NHANCED D ISTRIBUTED I NFERENCE IN
P RESENCE OF B YZANTINES

(8)

Proof: Define x = PdH − PfHa and a = PdB − PfBa ,for a
given PdB and PfBa , a is a constant and also a > 0. Therefore,
αblind =

x
x+a

d(αblind )
a
.
=
dx
(x + a)2
Thus, αblind is a monotonically increasing function w.r.t x.
Therefore, in order to maximize αblind , we must maximize x.
This is very similar to the problem of finding the optimal
SR noise pdf for Byzantine detection (minimizing Pe ), as
described in [8], and hence x is maximized by a 1-peak SR.
In other words, 1-peak noise is the optimal SR signal that
maximizes αblind .

In this case, the network performance improves because
the honest nodes’ performance is improved, while the Byzantines’ performance remains the same. Therefore, we expect
an increase in αblind , thereby improving the robustness of
the network. We show this phenomenon in the following two
examples.
a) Example-1 (Gaussian mixture noise): The channel
noise between the primary transmitter and the local sensors
is symmetric, Gaussian mixture with pdf,
p(x) =

1
1
γ(x; −µ, σ02 ) + γ(x; µ, σ02 )
2
2

(9)

(x − µ)2
1
exp[−
]. Here, we set
where, γ(x; µ, σ 2 ) = √
2σ 2
2πσ 2
µ = 3, A = 1 and σ0 = 1. The distribution of x under H0
and H1 hypotheses are,
p0 (x) =

1
1
γ(x; −µ, σ02 ) + γ(x; µ, σ02 )
2
2

(10)

and
p1 (x) =

1
1
γ(x; −µ + A, σ02 ) + γ(x; µ + A, σ02 )
2
2

(11)

respectively.
If we add 1-peak SR (pH
w (t) = δ(t − c0 )) only at the honest
nodes, we can obtain αblind as given in Equation (12).
b) Example 2 (Cauchy Noise): The pdf for cauchy noise
is given by
pn (t) =

λ
λ + (t − µ)2

(13)

to be 0.5, as in the case of no-SR. This can be explained
from Equation (8) as both the optimal pdfs for SR at the
honest and the Byzantine nodes are the same. Intuitively, this
can be explained by the fact that the optimal strategy for the
Byzantine nodes is to employ the same strategy as that of the
honest nodes which employ optimal strategies to improve the
performance of the network. The deterministic flipping of data
at the Byzantine nodes results in the maximum degradation in
the performance of the network.
In the case when the honest nodes have a majority in the
network, then one can immediately perceive an improvement
in the global detection performance. This is later justified in
our numerical results presented in Section V.
B. SR employed at the FC
Next, we consider the addition of SR noise at the fusion
center. We assume a Rayleigh fading model to account for
the non-ideal transmissions between the local sensors and the
fusion center. This model for sensor-to-fusion center channels
has been analyzed in the past (See [9]–[11]). In [10], an optimal likelihood ratio (LR)-based fusion was derived assuming
full knowledge of the instantaneous channel state information
(CSI) and local sensor detection performance indices. In [11],
the likelihood ratio based on channel statistics (LRT-CS) was
derived and shown to perform well as compared to the optimal
LR fusion rule. The test eliminates the need for instantaneous
CSI, but still requires knowledge of the channel statistics as
well as the performance indices of the local sensors. The
fusion rule that requires the least information is the equal gain
combiner (EGC) given below.

We now compute the optimum 1-peak SR for this channel.
Following the discussion of [8], the optimal 1-peak SR should
satisfy the following equation
X
pX
0 (−c) = p0 (−c − A)

where pX
o (t) = pn (t) and pw (t) = δ(t − c)

Honest Nodes

(14)

φH
1

(15)

A
(16)
2
For the case when 1-peak SR is added at the honest nodes
only, the αblind expression after substituting (13) is given in
Equation (17).
It is easy to see that both the expressions in Equations (12)
and (17) are greater than or equal to 0.5.
2) CASE-2 (SR at honest and Byzantine nodes): Both
Byzantine and honest sensors apply SR noise to their true
observations in order to improve their respective performances.
But the Byzantines’ choice of the SR signal is the one which
reduces the performance of the network to the maximum
possible extent, while that of the honest sensors is to improve
the performance of the network. It is easy to see that the
optimal SR noise pdf from the Byzantine’s perspective is also
a one-peak pdf.
When both honest and the Byzantine nodes use the optimal
SR to improve their performance, then αblind again turns out

r̂1H
+

S1

XN −M

SN −M

On solving the above equation, we get
copt = −µ −

r1H

uH
1

X1

H
rN
−M

uH
N −M

XN −M +1

SN −M +1

uB
N −M +1

H
r̂N
−M

φH
N −M

Channel

Phenomenon

+

Fusion

B
B
rN
−M +1 r̂N −M +1

+

φB
N −M +1
XN

SN

uB
N

B
rN

B
r̂N

+

φB
N
Byzantine Nodes
Fusion Center

Fig. 2: Inference network model when SR is employed at the
FC

Λ(r̂) =

N
1 X
r̂k .
N

(18)

k=1

where r̂k is the signal received from the k th node after the
SR noise is added (Refer to Figure 2). It has been shown that
the EGC based fusion rule, although suboptimal, performs
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reasonably well for most practical SNR values [10]. We,
therefore, consider the EGC based fusion rule in this work,
and investigate if its performance can be enhanced using SR
in the presence of Byzantines. We use the deflection coefficient
[12],
(E(Λ|H1 ) − E(Λ|H0 ))2
(19)
D(Λ) =
Var(Λ|H0 )
as a performance criterion due to its simplicity and its strong
relationship with the actual overall detection performance [13].
IV. G AME -T HEORETIC M ODEL FOR D ISTRIBUTED
I NFERENCE IN THE P RESENCE OF B YZANTINE N ODES
In this section, we will analyse the problem of Byzantine
attacks on the network in the presence of SR at the local
sensors from a game theoretic perspective. Byzantines and the
network are the two players of the game. The aim of the
Byzantines is to deteriorate the performance of the network
while the network’s goal is to survive the Byzantine attack
and improve the performance to maximum possible extent.
We formulate a zero-sum game between the Byzantine
nodes and the inference network as a two-player zero-sum
minimax game between the Byzantine nodes and the network
with the utility function as the KL divergence. The set of
strategies for the Byzantine node is defined by the p.d.f. of
the SR noise, pB
w (t) employed at the Byzantine nodes, while
that of the honest nodes is defined by pH
w (t).
Hence, the problem statement is given as follows.

H
pB
w (w) pw (w)

1.

R

2.

R

pH
w (t)dt = 1

V. N UMERICAL R ESULTS
In this section, we present our numerical results for a
network of N = 100 sensors. We consider two different cases
to apply SR in the distributed inference network - one is the
case when we apply SR only to the observations at the local
sensors and the other being the case when SR is employed
at the FC. We present these two scenarios in the following
subsections.
Note that in order to analyze this system, we consider the
following three types of SR noises.
• Optimal 1-peak SR
pw (t) = δ(t + 3.5)

•

(21)

Note: The optimal 1-peak SR which should be added for
this case can be obtained from the discussion of [8].
Optimal 2-peak SR
pw (t) = βδ(t + 3.5) + (1 − β)δ(t − 2.5)

(22)

where β = 0.3085
Optimal Gaussian SR noise

A. Scenario 1: SR applied locally at the nodes

min max D̂KL = max min D̂KL

s.t.

In this paper, we consider an example where ni ∼ p(x)
(as given in Equation (9)) is a Gaussian mixture noise with
two peaks. Due to the concavity of the log(·) function, one
can easily show that the optimal SR noise is again a one-peak
SR noise. This is because the optimal strategy in the case
of a quasiconcave or a quasiconvex payoff function results in
an atomic distribution for the mixed strategy [14]. Therefore,
B
pH
w (t) = δ(t − cH ) and pw (t) = δ(t − cB ).

•

B
Problem Statement. Find {pH
w (w), pw (w)} such that

(17)

B
pH
w (w) pw (w)

(20)

pB
w (t)dt = 1

where D̂KL = DKL , whenever Pf a ≤ Pd . Otherwise,
D̂KL = −DKL . This is necessary in order to take into account
the performance domination of Byzantines in the game, which
the traditional DKL does not provide us due to its nonnegativity and symmetry about Pf a = Pd .

As discussed earlier in Section III, we first present our
results for the case when honest nodes alone employ SR, and
later present the case when both honest and Byzantine nodes
employ SR locally.
CASE-1 (SR employed at the honest nodes alone): First, we
assume that all the sensors are identical (i.e., in the absence
of SR, all the sensors have the same values of PD and PF A )
and that only the honest sensors add SR. The Byzantines
are attacking independently without any collaboration amongst
themselves by simply flipping their decisions before sending
them to the fusion center.
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Fig. 3: DKL vs. No. of Byzantines when only honest sensors add SR

SR added
Optimal 1-peak
Optimal 2-peak
Gaussian
No SR

αblind (simulated)
0.94
0.94
0.91
0.5

αblind (analytical)
0.944
0.944
0.9127
0.5

TABLE I: αblind for different types of SR added
Next, we consider the case when the network is heterogeneous. To examine the robustness of the system, we look at the
case if the Byzantines have better performance compared to the
honest sensors, particularly when the probability of detection
B
(PD
) is higher compared to the honest sensors for the same
value of probability of false alarm (PfHa = PfBa ).
Fig. 4 shows the DKL vs. No. of Byzantines plot for this
scenario. Optimal 1-peak SR noise is added at the honest local
sensors. For the same values of PF A , we plot three curves
B
for three different increasing values of PD
. One can see that
as the Byzantines become stronger, the network performance

deteriorates since DKL drops to zero more rapidly with
B
increasing PD
.
0.2
B
PD
= 0.5114
B
PD
= 0.5625

0.15
KL Divergence

Figure 3 shows the performance enhancement obtained by
adding SR to honest nodes only. Figure 3a depicts the change
in DKL with the no. of Byzantines in the network for the noSR as well as with-SR case. Since the no-SR curve is barely
visible, it is shown in an expanded view in Figure 3b. Clearly,
all the curves follow a similar trajectory with the difference
being their magnitudes and the values on the x-axis at which
the DKL decays to zero (which correspond to αblind for the
different cases - the minimum fraction of Byzantines required
to make the fusion center blind).
The no SR curve drops to zero when 50% of the sensors are
Byzantines (αblind = 0.5), since at this point, both the honest
and Byzantine sensors become equally strong. The Gaussian
SR noise provides some improvement compared to the noSR case in terms of both relative magnitudes and αblind . The
optimal 2-peak SR noise gives further improvement and the
performance is maximized by the 1-peak SR noise. As pointed
out earlier, the 1-peak SR is the optimal noise to be added.
Table I shows the values of αblind for all the cases. We have
compared the results obtained from the simulations with our
analytical results and both are in close agreement.

B
PD
= 0.6137

0.1

0.05

0
0

20

40
60
No. of Byzantines

80

100

B
Fig. 4: DKL vs. No. of Byzantines for different values of PD
keeping Pf a fixed at 0.5. SR employed at honest nodes alone.

Table II shows the decay in the network performance as PD
increases in the form of decreasing values of αblind .
Byzantine PD s
PD1 = 0.5114
PD2 = 0.5625
PD3 = 0.6137

αblind (simulated)
0.94
0.75
0.62

αblind (analytical)
0.944
0.7531
0.6265

TABLE II: αblind for increasing values of PD
Finally, we present our results for the two examples considered earlier - Gaussian mixture noise and the Cauchy noise.
We present the results for the Cauchy noise case alone in
Figure 5, while Table III shows the performance comparison
in terms of αblind of both the noisy channels.
Figure 5 shows the plot of KL divergence against the
number of Byzantines in the network when µ = 1 and
λ = 1. Again, the significant improvement in the network
performance after adding SR as compared to the no-SR case
is articulated through our results.
CASE-2 (SR employed at both honest and Byzantine nodes):
We present this case for three different types of SR signals.
Fig. 6 shows the DKL vs. No. of Byzantines curve. The curves

no SR
SR enhanced
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Fig. 5: DKL vs. No. of Byzantines curve when SR employed
at honest nodes alone for the Cauchy channel
Gaussian mixture noise channel
Cauchy channel

analytical
0.944
0.742

simulation
0.94
0.75

Sensor-to-Fusion Center Channel SNR: 5 dB
EGC
EGC-SR
0.03

Deflection Coefficient

0.3
KL divergence

7 shows how the deflection coefficient varies with increasing
number of Byzantines in the network. It is evident from the
figure that SR provides detection performance improvement,
but since the deflection coefficient becomes zero when α =
αblind = 0.5, there is no improvement in the design from a
security perspective. This can be attributed to the fact that SR
is employed at both the Byzantine and the honest sensors. In
the future, we will investigate the case where SR is applied to
the honest nodes’ receptions alone at the FC.

0.02

TABLE III: αblind comparison between analytical and simulation results
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start from the same point on the y-axis as in the SR-only-athonest sensors case. However, all the three curves decay quite
rapidly and reach zero when 50% of the sensor population
becomes Byzantines. This happens in the same way as we
had in the no SR case where DKL dropped to zero when
Byzantines became as strong as the honest sensors. So, the
result is intuitively correct. For all the three cases, we get
αblind = 0.5.
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Fig. 6: DKL vs. No. of Byzantines. SR is added at all the
sensors, both honest and Byzantines
Although this case did not provide the necessary robustness
in terms of security, later in the paper, we will analyze the
problem from a game-theoretic perspective in order to find
the optimal strategies employed by the Byzantine nodes and
the inference network.
B. Scenario 2: SR applied at the FC
In this scenario, we consider a simple example where a
one-peak noise is applied at the FC. We simulate the example
scenario for about 100,000 Monte-Carlo runs and calculate
the deflection coefficient as given by Equation (19). Figure

Fig. 7: Deflection Coefficient as a function of the number of
Byzantines when SR is employed at the Rayleigh-faded FC’s
receptions.

C. Game-Theoretic Formulation of Inference in the presence
of SR and Byzantine attacks
In this paper, we present results only for the example in
which p0 , p1 = 0.5, µ1 = −3, µ2 = 3, and σ12 = σ22 = 1 and
as discussed earlier, the SR noise wi is a one-peak noise with
p.d.f. given by δ(t − c<T > ) for a node of type T (Example
considered by Chen et al., in [7]). Here, T = H/B, where H
stands for Honest and B stands for Byzantine. Note that we
focus on finding those saddle points that minimize D̂KL with
respect to cB , while maximize the same with respect to cH .
Figure 8 depicts how the contours of D̂KL vary with the SR
noise parameters cH and cB respectively, when α = 0.5. In
this case, we find that when cH = cB = 0 (the case when no
SR is applied at either the honest or the Byzantine node), the
network is blinded since D̂KL = 0. One can clearly observe
that, for a given SR signal at the honest node, a deviation in cB
from zero results in a performance degradation and vice versa.
Also, note that the Nash equilibria are the points (-3.5, -3.5),
(-3.5, 2.5), (2.5, -3.5) and (2.5, 2.5). These are very similar to
the optimal SR signals computed by Chen et al., in [7] when
SR is not applied locally at the sensors. Due to symmetry in the
example considered in Figure 8, all the equilibria correspond
to D̂KL = 0.
Figure 9 plots the contours of D̂KL against cH and cB ,
when α = 0.2. Note that the equilibria points are very close
to those in the case of α = 0.5 case (with a slight skew), but
the detection performance at the equilibria in terms of D̂KL
improved with decreasing α.
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no Byzantines in the network.
Future work will involve the case when SR is employed at
both local sensors and the FC. Also, we will investigate other
channel-aware fusion strategies. Another important problem
that we will look at is the problem of SR at honest nodes when
the Byzantine-identification scheme is not error-free. It will
also be interesting to investigate the different game-theoretic
formulations, such as the case where SR is employed at FC
and Bayesian game models are considered with incomplete
information.
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Fig. 8: Contour plots of D̂KL as a function of cH and cB in
the presence of Gaussian mixture noise for α = 0.5.
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the presence of Gaussian mixture noise when α = 0.2.

VI. C ONCLUSION

AND

F UTURE W ORK

In this paper, we have shown that SR phenomenon provides robustness to the designs along with the performance
improvement, especially when the scenario is favorable to the
inference network. If the Byzantines simply attack by flipping
their decisions and not employ SR noise in their designs, then
the αblind increased beyond 50%, providing us with better
security. In the case when Byzantines are equally powerful
with SR being employed in the designs, then the robustness is
not different from the no-SR case, but we found a performance
improvement in terms of detection if the honest nodes form
the majority. We also found that the p.d.f. of the optimal SR
noise in the presence of Byzantine attackers is the same as
that of the results given by Chen et al., in [7], when there are
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